















Hungarian	 case,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	 conditions	 set	 out	 by	 this	 model	 are	 insufficient	 for	
ensuring	a	democratic	regime	against	erosion.	On	this	basis,	the	paper	considers	additional	
elements	 to	 understand	 Fidesz's	 reforms:	 the	 importance	 of	 deeper	 commitments	 to	
democracy	 among	 the	 leadership	 of	 mainstream	 parties,	 and	 the	 pivotal	 role	 of	 party	
strategies	 of	 citizen	mobilization	 in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 young	democracies.	 Drawing	 on	
these	insights,	the	paper	argues	for	approaching	democratic	consolidation	as	an	agent-led	
process	 of	 cultural	 change,	 emphasising	 the	 socializing	 role	 of	 mainstream	 parties'	










	 In	 2007,	 Rupnik	 spoke	 of	 a	 “post-transitional	 and	 post-accession	 backlash	 against	
(the	liberal)	consensus”	in	Central	Eastern	Europe	(CEE)	(Rupnik,	2007,	p.	20).	Since	then,	
democratic	 institutions	 have	 been	 weakened	 in	 several	 younger	 European	 Union	 (EU)	






optimistic	as	 to	 the	speed	and	quality	of	democratization	 in	these	countries	(Clark,	2002;	
King,	2000,	pp.	166-169;	Schneider	&	Schmitter,	2004).	Along	with	CEE	states	like	Slovenia,	
Poland	and	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary	was	considered	a	post-communist	success	story.	
The	 country	achieved	a	peaceful	 and	negotiated	 transition	 to	democratic	 rule	 in	October	
1989,	which	was	facilitated	by	one	of	the	least	stringent	communist	regimes	in	the	region	
(Rothschild	&	Wingfield,	2000,	pp.	239-245).	Subsequently,	it	developed	viable	parties	that	
alternated	 regularly	around	 two	main	party	blocs	until	2010,	displaying	one	of	 the	most	





institutionalized	 party	 systems	 in	 the	 region	 (Casal	 Bértoa	 &	 Mair,	 2010;	 Lewis,	 2006;	
Olson,	 1998;	 Sikk,	 2005).	 Hungary	 was	 among	 the	 first	 countries	 to	 open	 EU	 accession	
negotiations	 in	 1998,	 and	 complied	 particularly	 successfully	 with	 membership	
requirements.	These	 included	 the	 'political'	dimension	of	 the	Copenhagen	criteria,	which	
demanded	from	future	member	states	that	their	institutions	be	governed	by	"the	values	of	
respect	 for	human	dignity,	 freedom,	democracy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	of	 law	 and	 respect	 for	
human	rights"	(Article	2	TEU)	(Batory,	2008;	European	Commission,	2003).		
	 However,	 this	 is	 also	 the	 country	 in	 the	 region	 that	 experienced	 the	most	 severe	
erosion	 of	 its	 democratic	 institutions	 over	 the	 last	 decade,	 defying	 expectations	 of	 both	
academic	 analysts	 and	 EU	 public	 officials.	 The	 far-reaching	 constitutional	 reforms	 of	
conservative	 party	 Fidesz	 (Fiatal	 Demokraták	 Szövetsége)	 since	 the	 2010	 Hungarian	
Parliamentary	 elections,	 attracted	 criticism	 from	 a	 number	 of	 independent	 international	
organizations	-	 including	the	European	Parliament,	 the	Council	of	Europe,	 the	Norwegian	
Helsinki	 Committee,	 and	 the	 American	 State	 Department	 (Council	 of	 Europe,	 2013;	
European	 Parliament,	 2013;	 Norwegian	 Helsinki	 Commitee,	 2013;	 United	 States	
Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	2013)..	This	paper	takes	as	its	point	of	
departure	 the	 mismatch	 between	 positive	 assessments	 of	 the	 solidity	 of	 Hungarian	
democracy	up	to	2010,	and	the	empirical	reality	of	contemporary	Hungarian	politics	since	
then.	 It	 explains	 this	 mismatch	 by	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 dominant	 analytical	 tools	 for	
understanding	 the	 role	 of	 mainstream	 political	 parties	 	 in	 post-communist	






and	 mechanisms	 according	 to	 which	 democratic	 regimes	 develop	 and	 survive.	 Scholars	
largely	 agree	 on	 how	 to	define	 the	 first	 two	phases	of	 democratization:	 first,	 a	 period	of	
liberalization,	 characterized	 by	 the	 non-democratic	 regime	 gradually	 conceding	 reforms;	
second,	 a	 period	 of	 democratic	 transition,	 considered	 as	 closed	 when	 a	 democratic	
constitution	is	agreed	upon	and	the	first	competitive	elections	take	place.	The	third	phase	
of	democratic	consolidation	 -	which	 is	 the	 focus	of	 this	paper	 -	 is	 a	process	by	which	 the	
risks	of	erosion	of	the	democratic	institutions,	established	during	the	transition	phase,	are	
progressively	 reduced.	 It	 amounts	 to	 "transforming	 the	 set	 of	 democratic	 rules	 and	










                                                             




to	 the	 political	 process	 and	 their	 opportunities	 for	 contesting	 public	 decision-making,	
require	 institutional	 guarantees	 in	 eight	 different	 domains:	 1.	 Freedom	 to	 form	 and	 join	
organizations;	2.	Freedom	of	expression;	3.	Right	 to	vote;	4.	Eligibility	 for	public	office;	5.	
Right	of	political	 leaders	to	compete	 for	support;	6.	Alternative	sources	of	 information;	7.	
Free	and	fair	elections;	8.	Institutions	for	making	government	policies	depend	on	votes	and	
other	expressions	of	preference	(Dahl,	1971,	p.	3).	While	the	term	polyarchy	was	coined	to	
"maintain	 the	 distinction	 between	 democracy	 as	 an	 ideal	 system	 and	 the	 institutional	
arrangements	 that	have	 come	 to	be	 regarded	as	a	kind	of	 imperfect	 approximation	of	 an	
ideal"	(Dahl,	1971,	p.	9),	this	paper	will	use	the	term	democracy	to	designate	a	regime	that	
fulfils	the	procedural	criteria	set	out	in	Dahl's	model	of	polyarchy.		
Rational-institutionalist	models	 define	 a	 consolidated	 democracy	 as	 one	 in	which	
parties	 competing	 for	 power	 prefer	 to	 take	 part	 in	 an	 institutionalized	 form	 of	 political	
struggle,	 rather	than	challenge	 these	 institutional	 guarantees.	 In	 the	words	of	Pzeworski,	
"democracy	 is	 consolidated	 when	 compliance	 -	 acting	 within	 the	 institutional	
framework	-	constitutes	 the	equilibrium	of	 the	decentralized	strategies	of	all	the	relevant	
forces"	 (Przeworski,	 1991,	 p.	 26).	 The	 relevant	 actors	 here	 are	 mainstream	 parties,	
understood	not	 in	 terms	of	 their	 ideological	moderation	but	 in	 terms	of	 their	 capacity	 to	
form	a	 single-party	government	or	head	a	governmental	 coalition.	According	 to	 rational-
institutionalist	 frameworks,	mainstream	party	compliance	with	the	democratic	process	 is	
dependent	on	the	type	of	institutional	framework	established	during	the	transition	phase,	




first	 part	 of	 this	 paper	 emphasises	 its	 limited	 explanatory	 power	 in	 the	Hungarian	 case.	
Many	scholars	that	were	applying	rational-institutionalist	criteria	considered	Hungary	one	
of	the	most	'consolidated'	of	CEE	democracies.	A	strong	Fidesz	majority	was,	nevertheless,	









cultural	 theories	of	democratic	 consolidation	 that	 insist	on	 the	 central	 role	of	both	mass	
and	 elite	 attitudes	 towards	 democracy.	 Building	 on	 these	 theories,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	
dynamics	of	 party-citizen	 relations	 condition	whether	or	not	 such	 commitments	 develop	









is	 the	minimalist	or	procedural	definition	of	democracy,	 first	put	 forward	by	Schumpeter	
(Schumpeter,	 1943).	 Dahl's	 concept	 of	 'polyarchy'	 -	 a	 regime	 type	 that	 guarantees	
opportunities	 for	 all	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 political	 process,	 and	 to	 contest	 public	
decision-making	through	a	series	of	institutional	arrangements	-	is	a	widely	used	standard	
in	this	literature	(Dahl,	1971).	The	contention	here	is	that	more	extensive	definitions	lead	
to	 conceptual	 confusion	 and	 measurement	 problems.	 Additional,	 non-procedural	
characteristics	 one	 could	 attach	 to	 a	 democratic	 ideal-type	 –	 high	 levels	 of	 education,	 a	
vibrant	civil	society,	mass	political	engagement,	a	reasonable	level	of	social	equality,	etc.	–	
are	 argued	 to	 matter	 only	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 democracy,	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 definition	 of	
democracy	itself.		
To	satisfy	the	requirement	of	conceptual	clarity,	rational-institutionalist	approaches	
also	 adopt	 a	 minimal	 definition	 of	 democratic	 consolidation,	 concerned	 solely	 with	 the	
integrity	 and	 survival	 of	 this	 'procedural	 minimum'	 (Schedler,	 1998,	 p.	 103).	 These	
approaches	focus	on	elite	behaviour	-	rather	than	their	attitudes	-	within	this	institutional	
framework.	Democracy	is	considered	consolidated	when	rational	elites	prefer	to	take	part	
in	 an	 institutionalized	 form	 of	 political	 competition	 rather	 than	 attempt	 to	 subvert	 the	
system	 as	 a	 whole.	 Consolidation	 thus	 ultimately	 depends	 on	 whether	 the	 cost-benefit	
analysis	of	key	actors	is	favourable	to	democracy:	if	risks	associated	with	non-compliance	
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are	 greater	 than	 those	 associated	with	 compliance,	 democracy	will	 reach	 a	 self-enforced	
equilibrium	(see	Alevizakos,	2008;	Clark,	2002;	Przeworski,	1991).		
Institutions	 are	 essential	 as	 they	 provide	 incentive	 structures	 that	 constrain	 self-
serving	 actors	 -	 they	 reward	 compliant	 behaviour	 and	 sanction	 non-compliance.	 Parties	
first	 establish	 these	 institutions	 to	 jugulate	 the	 threats	 of	 unregulated	 competition.	 The	
initial	 constitutional	 design	 is	 thus	 seen	 to	 result	 from	 an	 ‘elite	 pact’	 between	 the	
authoritarian	 regimes’	 hardliners,	 reformers,	 and	 a	 newly	 emerging	 counter-elite,	 as	 all	
have	an	interest	in	accepting	free	and	fair	elections	rather	than	facing	potential	destruction	
(Di	Palma,	1990;	O'Donnell	et	al.,	1986).	Similarly,	the	subsequent	phase	of	state	building	
also	 results	 from	 the	 uncertainty	 created	 by	 elite	 competition.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 not	 only	
because	 the	majority	 in	 place	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 abuse	 its	 own	 power	 if	 it	 is	 checked	 by	 a	
strong	and	vigilant	opposition,	but	also	because	the	weakening	of	state	institutions	is	likely	
to	play	 in	 its	disfavour	 in	 the	plausible	event	of	 electoral	defeat	 (Grzymala-Busse,	2007).	
Grzymala-Busse’s	reliance	on	the	image	of	Hobbes’	Leviathan	is	a	most	adequate	metaphor:	
as	in	the	original	social	contract	theory,	elites	accept	the	constraints	of	a	given	institutional	
framework	 because	 the	 alternative,	 an	 environment	 of	 intense	 competition,	 may	 imply	
their	destruction	by	competing	forces	(Grzymala-Busse,	2007).	This	is	the	logic	underlying	
Pzeworski	definition	of	democracy	as	the	'institutionalization	of	uncertainty':	competition	
among	 elites	 creates	 a	 climate	 of	 uncertainty,	 one	 that	 can	 only	 be	 eased	 through	 a	
framework	 that	 institutionalizes	 competition,	 and	 thus	 a	 democratic	 framework	 in	 the	
minimalist	sense	(Przeworski,	1991,	ch.	1).		
Well-designed	 democratic	 institutions,	 in	 turn,	 generate	 elite	 compliance	 by	
reducing	 the	 stakes	 of	 political	 battle.	 Proportional	 representation	 and	 parliamentarism	
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are	 thus	 often	 viewed	 as	 'low-stakes'	 institutional	 design,	 as	 they	 offer	 losers	 means	 to	
influence	the	policy	process,	and	a	real	prospect	of	obtaining	power	in	upcoming	elections.	
Relevant	 actors	 can	 then	 calculate	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 future	 defeat	within	 this	 institutional	
framework	is	preferable	to	the	risks	associated	with	regime	overthrow	(Przeworski,	1991,	
ch.	 1).	 Democratic	 consolidation	 is	 then	 the	 process	 by	 which	 elites	 get	 locked	 into	 an	




Classifications	 of	 the	 speed	 and	 quality	 of	 democratization	 in	 the	 post-communist	
world	 systematically	 placed	 CEE	 countries	 at	 the	 forefront,	 and	 even	 the	most	 sceptical	
authors	 considered	 them	 exceptional	 examples	 of	 democratic	 success	 (for	 instance	
Carothers,	 2002,	 p.	 9;	 Tismaneanu,	 2002,	 p.	 5).	 Many	 of	 these	 positive	 assessments	
implicitly	or	explicitly	relied	on	the	premises	of	rational-institutionalism.	The	strong	focus	
of	 post-communist	 studies	 on	 the	 constitutional	 frameworks	 that	 resulted	 from	 the	
transition	period	 in	CEE	countries	 -	 including	the	 system	of	 checks-and-balances	and	 the	
type	of	electoral	system	-	 typically	stemmed	from	the	assumption	that	 these	 frameworks	
could	provide	incentives	for	actors	to	respect	the	democratic	rules	of	the	game	(Zielonka,	
2001).	 The	 scholarly	 debate	 as	 to	 the	 respective	 merits	 of	 parliamentarism	 and	
presidentialism	for	the	survival	of	democracy	is	most	emblematic	in	this	regard	(Lijphart,	
1992;	Linz	&	Valenzuela,	1994).	In	the	second,	post-transitional	phase,	scholars	focused	on	





as	 strong	 institutions	 of	 oversight	 supervising	 respect	 for	 electoral	 procedures	 and	
fundamental	 liberties,	 were	 prime	 objects	 of	 study	 (Grzymala-Busse,	 2007).	 Institutions	
were	 also	 central	 for	 the	 assessments	 of	 democratic	 progress	 made	 by	 international	
organizations.	 For	 instance,	 the	 opening	 of	 EU	 accession	 negotiations	 for	 most	 of	 these	
countries	in	the	late	1990s	was	conditioned	upon	an	acceptance	of	the	Copenhagen	criteria.	
Established	 in	 1993,	 these	 are	 based	 not	 only	 on	 candidates	 respecting	 the	 acquis	
communautaire,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 institutional	 framework	 of	 democracy.	 This	 'political'	
dimension	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 criteria	 thus	 required	 CEE	 countries	 to	 set	up	 an	 effective	
process	 of	 judicial	 review,	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 clientelism	 and	 corruption,	 and	 to	
guarantee	both	political	and	civil	freedoms,	especially	for	minorities	(Grabbe,	2006).	
The	focus	of	post-communist	studies	on	parties	and	party	systems	also	results	from	
the	 prevalence	 of	 rational-institutionalist	 understandings	 of	 democratic	 consolidation.	
Both,	the	development	of	parties	as	organizations	of	the	state,	and	the	increased	regularity	
of	patterns	of	party	competition	were	taken	as	indicators	of	the	compliance	of	mainstream	











by	 Huntington’s	 'two-turnover	 test',	 according	 to	 which	 a	 democratic	 regime	 can	 be	
considered	 consolidated	 when	 it	 undergoes	 two	 peaceful	 turnovers	 of	 ruling	 parties	 in	
transparent	 and	 fair	 elections	 (Huntington,	 1991,	 p.	 267).3	 The	 fact	 that	 elections	
repeatedly	 provoke	 power	 alternation	without	 the	 results	 being	 challenged,	 thus	 offer	 a	
strong	 indication	 that	 the	 institutional	 set-up	 is	 providing	 the	 right	 incentives	 to	 salient	
actors.	 Such	a	 concern	also	explains	 the	wealth	of	studies	 that	 focused	on	 the	number	of	
parties	competing	in	each	successive	election,	their	size,	the	degree	of	polarization	within	




party	 systems	were	 effectively	 institutionalizing	 -	 and	 thus	 democracy	 consolidating	 -	 in	
most	 CEE	 countries,	 with	 Hungary,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Estonia,	 and	 Slovenia	 as	
frontrunners.	With	the	exception	of	Vladimir	Mečiar's	Movement	for	a	Democratic	Slovakia	
(HZDS),	mainstream	CEE	parties	preferred	to	 follow,	rather	than	subvert,	 the	rules	of	 the	
                                                             




democratic	 game.4	 By	 the	 mid-2000s	 all	 of	 the	 future	 EU	 members	 had	 fulfilled	
Huntington’s	 two-turnover	 test,	 and	 most	 displayed	 party	 systems	 with	 increasingly	
regular	 patterns	 of	 competition.	 The	willingness	 of	 ex-communist	 parties	 to	 reform	was	
considered	an	essential	sign	of	the	consolidation	of	CEE	democracies	(Bozóki	&	Ishiyama,	
2002;	 Grzymala-Busse,	 2002;	 Hanley,	 Szczerbiak,	 Haughton,	 &	 Fowler,	 2008;	 Ishiyama,	
1999).	While	radical	parties	did	achieve	representation	 in	the	1990s,	 they	were	excluded	





the	 radical	 revision	 of	 the	 constitution	 in	 October	 1989	 (Hungarian	 Parliament,	 1989).	
While	 the	 latter	did	not	meet	all	 the	 features	of	a	 'low-stakes'	design,	because	of	a	mixed	
electoral	 system	 and	 a	 fairly	 flexible	 procedure	 for	 constitutional	 amendment,	 it	 was	
nevertheless	considered	to	"satisfy	the	needs	for	democracy"	(Szikinger,	2001,	p.	429).	The	
Hungarian	Communist	party	held	its	last	congress	during	this	same	month,	and	converted	
to	 a	 social-democratic	 platform	under	 the	MSzP	 (Magyar	 Szocialista	 Párt)	 party	 banner.	
The	 first	 democratic	 elections	 followed	 in	May	 1990,	 during	which	 the	 centre-right	MDF	
scored	 43%	 of	 votes	 (Rothschild	 &	 Wingfield,	 2000,	 pp.	 239-245).	 By	 the	 late	 1990s,	
Hungary	 displayed	 what	 many	 scholars	 classified	 as	 the	 most	 institutionalized	 party	
                                                             
4	The	party	led	a	governmental	coalition	twice	in	the	periods	1992–4	and	1994–8	with	Vladimir	Mečiar	as	Prime	Minister.	
Controversial	decisions	 included	disrespect	 for	media	 independence,	 a	privatisation	process	 that	 lacked	 transparency,	
and	 a	 discriminatory	 policy	 towards	 national	 -	 especially	 Hungarian	 -	 minorities.	 This	 prompted	 the	 EU	 to	 exclude	






Bértoa	&	Mair,	 2010;	Grzymala-Busse,	 2007;	Lewis,	 2006;	 Sikk,	 2005).	 Further,	Hungary	




	 Despite	 these	 positive	 assessments,	 democracy's	 'procedural	 minimum'	 has	 been	
undermined	 in	 several	 CEE	 countries	 following	 their	 accession	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	 Poland,	 the	
conservative	 Law	 and	 Justice	 party	 (PiS)	 initiated	 several	 controversial	 institutional	
reforms	 in	 2005-2007	 that	 challenged	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 Polish	 administration	
(Jasiewicz,	2007,	pp.	30-32;	Michnik,	2007;	O'Dwyer,	2008,	pp.	1184-1187).	Citizens	for	the	
European	Development	of	Bulgaria	 (Gerb),	 the	 conservative	party	 that	won	 the	Bulgarian	
parliamentary	 elections	 in	 2009	 and	 2013,	 was	 accused	 of	 electoral	 fraud	 in	 the	
parliamentary	 elections	 of	May	 2013	 (Troev	&	Buckley,	 2013).	 Similarly	 in	 2012,	 Viktor	
Ponta's	 leftist	 Social	 Liberal	 Union	 (SUL)	 interfered	 in	 the	 proceedings	 of	 the	 country's	
Constitutional	Court	 to	suspend	Romania's	president	Traian	Basescu,	shortly	after	having	
won	an	absolute	majority	in	the	parliamentary	elections	(Buckley,	2012).		
The	 case	 of	 Hungary	 remains	 the	 most	 puzzling.	 While	 it	 was	 set	 as	 a	 model	 of	
democratic	 consolidation	 in	 the	EU's	post-communist	space,	 it	 also	experienced	 the	most	
severe	challenges	to	democratic	institutions	that	were	taking	place	in	the	region	since	the	
end	 of	 communism	 (Council	 of	 Europe,	 2013;	 Dani,	 2013;	 European	 Parliament,	 2013;	
Kornai,	2011;	Norwegian	Helsinki	Commitee,	2013;	United	States	Commission	on	Security	
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and	 Cooperation	 in	 Europe,	 2013).	 In	 the	 Spring	 of	 2010,	 the	 Fidesz-KDNP	 coalition	
obtained	52.7%	of	the	votes,	a	score	that	translated	into	a	two-third	majority	in	Parliament	
given	Hungary's	mixed	electoral	system	(Benoit,	1996).5	Reaching	such	a	threshold	allowed	















New	 Cardinal	 Acts	were	 enacted	 on	 the	 freedom	 of	 association	 and	 regulation	 of	
NGOs	in	2011,	namely	Act	CLXXV/2011	on	the	Freedom	of	Association,	Public	Benefit	Status	and	










by	 three	 -	 in	 a	 country	 where	 in	 2012,	 40%	 of	 non-governmental	 organizations'	 (NGO)	
revenues	 originated	 from	 the	 state	 (Hungarian	 Central	 Statistical	 Office,	 2013).	 Further,	
civil	 society	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	 Joint	 Civil	 Forum	 (Civil	 Összefogás	 Fórum	 -	 CÖF)	
were	 particularly	 favoured	 by	 the	 National	 Cooperation	 Fund	 (NEA),	 in	 charge	 of	
distributing	 these	 funds.	 In	 past	 years,	 the	 CÖF	 organized	 a	 number	 of	 pro-government	




Norwegian	 Civil	 Support	 Fund,	 a	 week	 to	 release	 all	 information	 concerning	 their	
financing7.	On	September	8,	2014,	Hungarian	police	raided	the	Ökotárs	foundation	that	was	
in	 charge	 of	 disbursing	 these	 funds.	 Targeted	 organizations,	 such	 as	 Transparency	
International,	 view	 these	 actions	 as	 politically	 motivated,	 and	 destined	 to	 intimidate	
independent	 civil	society	organizations	 (Transparency	 International	Hungary,	2014).	The	
existence	 of	 a	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 audit	 of	 these	 organization	 was	 also	 questioned	 in	 an	
opinion	issued	on	July	23,	2014	by	Hungarian	Ombudsman	László	Székely	(Székely,	2014).	
2.	Freedom	of	expression	
                                                             
7	The	complete	list	includes	Társaság	a	Szabadságjogokért	(TASZ),	Nők	a	Nőkért	Együtt	az	Erőszak	Ellen	Egyesület	(Nane),	
Magyar	 Női	 Érdekérvényesítő	 Alapítvány,	 Patriarchátust	 Ellenzők	 Társasága	 (Patent),	 Transparency	 International	
Magyarország	 Alapítvány,	 K-Monitor	 Közhasznú	 Egyesület,	 the	 Asimov	 Alapítvány,	 Labrisz	 Leszbikus	 Egyesület,	
Szivárvány	Misszió	Alapítvány,	Liberális	Fiatalok	Egyesülete,	Demokratikus	Ifjúságért	Alapitvány	and	Roma	Sajtóközpont.		
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Two	 Cardinal	 Acts	 that	 established	 a	 new	 Hungarian	 Media	 Authority	 in	 2010	
figured	 among	 the	 most	 controversial	 of	 Fidesz	 reforms.8	 They	 establish	 appointment	
procedures	that	compromise	this	authority's	independence	from	government,	and	provide	






As	 stated	 by	 the	 OSCE	 critical	 report	 on	 Hungary's	 media	 situation,	 "a	 legal	
obligation	on	what	 content	media	outlets	 should	have	 is	not	 in	 line	with	 free	media	and	
freedom	of	expression"	(OSCE,	2011).	There	exist	concerns	especially	that	these	provisions	






total	 disenfranchisement	 of	 95,000	 persons	 in	 the	 2014	 elections,	 including	 26,000	
individuals	 guilty	 of	 criminal	 offences	 that	 had	 already	 completed	 their	 prison	 sentence.	
                                                             
8	The	new	Media	Constitution	was	passed	in	two	steps:	a	Media	Structure	Act	on	July	22,	2010	(Act	LXXXII	of	2010	on	the	
Modification	of	Certain	Acts	Regulating	the	Media	and	Electronic	Communications),	which	established	the	National	Media	





These	 provisions	 were	 considered	 to	 'lack	 proportionality'	 by	 the	 OSCE's	 Office	 for	






interference.	 This	 article	 stipulates	 that	 organizations	 related	 to	 the	 ex-Hungarian	
communist	party	are	'criminal',	and	mentions	explicitly	that	the	successor	to	this	party,	the	
MSzP,	shares	responsibility	in	these	crimes.	While	this	does	not	directly	restrict	the	rights	




recently	 introduced	 fiscal	 arrangements	 that	 overwhelmingly	 burden	 the	 last	 major	
independent	television	channel	 in	 the	country,	 the	German-owned	broadcaster	RTL	Klub.		
A	40%	tax	on	media	advertising	revenues	exceeding	HUF	20	billion	was	adopted	on	April	
11,	2014,	while	revenue	below	HUF	500	million	 is	exempt	 from	tax.	Other	 factors	curtail	
alternative	 sources	 of	 information	 in	 Hungary,	 such	 as	 the	 shrinking	 private	 advertising	





the	 other	 political	 organisations	 established	 to	 serve	 them	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 communist	 ideology	 were	 criminal	
organisations,	and	their	leaders	shall	have	responsibility	without	statute	of	limitations	(...)	(p)olitical	organisations	having	
gained	 legal	recognition	during	the	democratic	transition	as	 legal	successors	of	 the	Hungarian	Socialist	Workers’	Party	
continue	to	share	the	responsibility	of	their	predecessors	as	beneficiaries	of	their	unlawfully	accumulated	assets".	
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Between	 2010	 and	 2013,	 three	 new	 Cardinal	 laws	 regulating	 Parliamentary	
elections	were	 enacted.13	 A	 number	 of	 their	 provisions	make	 the	 electoral	 system	more	
majoritarian,	 and	 thus	 increase	 the	advantage	given	 to	 the	 leading	party	 in	an	election.14	
Further,	these	acts	include	a	number	of	provisions	that	favour	Fidesz	more	specifically.	For	
instance,	 the	 new	 constituency	 map	 is	 designed	 to	 compensate	 a	 slight	 left-wing	 lead;	
campaign	advertising	regulations	advantage	the	government	party;	and	acquiring	electoral	
suffrage	 was	 facilitated	 for	 non-resident	 Hungarians	 in	 neighbouring	 countries,	 a	
population	 among	 which	 Fidesz	 voters	 are	 over-represented	 (for	 a	 summary	 of	 these	
changes	and	their	consequences,	see	Bozóki,	2013;	Political	Capital,	2013).		
*	*	*	
As	 demonstrated	 here,	 the	 reforms	 initiated	 by	 Fidesz	 eroded	 institutional	
guarantees	 for	 Hungarian	 citizens'	 participation	 in,	 and	 contestation	 of	 public	 decision-
making	 in	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 eight	 domains	 stipulated	 by	 Dahl's	 'procedural	 minimum'.	
While	 the	 history	 of	 consolidated	 democracies	 offers	 many	 examples	 of	 institutional	
reforms	 destined	 to	 favour	 the	 party	 in	 power	 (Alexander,	 2001;	 Renwick,	 2010)	 -	
practices	of	gerrymandering	being	a	case	in	point	-	these	remain	limited	compared	to	the	
                                                             
13		See	CCIII/2011	Voting	Rights	Act,	XXXVI/2013	Electoral	Procedure	Act	and	LXXXVII/2013	Campaign	Finance	Act.	




scope	 of	 contemporary	 developments	 in	 Hungary.	 Given	 that,	 as	 shown	 earlier,	 most	
accounts	relying	on	the	rational-institutionalist	framework	classified	Hungarian	democracy	
as	 'consolidated'	 before	 2010,	 it	 appears	 necessary	 to	 engage	 a	 critical	 reading	 of	 these	
theories.	 The	 following	 section	 examines	 two	 additional	 factors	 that	 affect	 democratic	






competition	 ensure	 that	 for	 all	 relevant	 actors	 the	 costs	 of	 undermining	 democratic	
institutions	are	greater	than	the	risks	of	facing	future	defeat.	The	events	that	followed	the	




the	 question,	 however,	 whether	 any	 democratic	 regime	 could	 persist	 over	 time	 if	 party	
elites	were	to	systematically	adopt	such	a	reasoning	in	comparable	circumstances,	i.e.	when	





Alexander	 makes	 this	 argument	 explicit	 by	 applying	 theories	 of	 democratic	
consolidation	to	 'first	wave	democracies'	 -	which	a	rational-institutionalist	understanding	
would	 undeniably	 classify	 as	 'consolidated'	 (Alexander,	 2001,	 2002a,	 2002b).	 First,	
established	 democracies	 count	 a	 number	 of	 'high-stakes'	 frameworks,	 that	 increase	 the	
costs	associated	with	electoral	defeat	and	set	weaker	limitations	on	the	power	of	winning	
majorities.	These	 include	 institutional	designs	that	 favour,	 for	 instance,	unitary	 rule	over	
devolution,	or	majoritarian	electoral	systems	over	proportional	representation	(Alexander,	
2001,	p.	265).15	The	exceptionally	high	scores	achieved	by	Fidesz	in	2010	would	thus	have	
converted	 into	 a	 comparably	 high	 number	 of	 seats	 in	 many	 established	 democracies	 -	
notwithstanding	the	fact	that	Hungary's	previous	mixed	electoral	system	did	not	display	all	
the	features	of	a	'low-stakes'	design	(see	Benoit,	1996;	Szikinger,	2001).	Democracies	with	
high-stakes	 frameworks,	 such	 as	 France	 or	 Britain,	 nevertheless	 survived	 over	 decades.	
This	encourages	one	 to	 consider	additional	 characteristics	of	 these	 systems,	 appart	 from	
institutional	design,	that	make	them	more	resistant	than	the	Hungarian	framework.			
Institutions	 are	 also	 far	more	malleable	 than	 posited	 by	 the	 rational-institutional	
framework,	 constitutions	 necessarily	 including	 amendment	 or	 re-drafting	 provisions.	
While	 requirements	 vary	 from	 one	 country	 to	 another,	 the	 parliamentary	 route	 -	 as	
opposed	 to	 revision	 through	 referendum	 -	 generally	 involves	 some	 form	 of	 a	 qualified	
parliamentary	 majority.	 In	 Hungary	 for	 instance,	 the	 threshold	 for	 a	 new	 constitutional	















that	 institutions	 will	 be	 "self-perpetuating	 or	 vulnerable	 only	 to	 exogenous	 shocks"	
(Alexander,	2001,	p.	261).	In	the	last	half-century,	the	history	of	European	democracies	is	
permeated	with	examples	of	constitutional	revisions.	While	much	of	these	were	designed	
to	 favour	the	party	 initiating	them,	 they	did	not	 fundamentally	and	durably	challenge	the	
'procedural	 minimum'	 of	 these	 democratic	 regimes	 (Alexander,	 2001,	 pp.	 263-264;	
Renwick,	 2010).	 Undermining	 the	 institutional	 framework	 of	 democracy	 can,	 therefore,	
take	more	 incremental	 forms	 than	posited	 in	 the	 rational-institutionalist	model.	 In	other	
words,	 the	 choice	 opened	 to	 actors	 is	 not	 between	 a	 violent	 coup	 d'état	 and	 blind	
compliance	 to	 the	 democratic	 process	 -	 there	 is	 instead	 a	 wealth	 of	 intermediary	
possibilities,	 ranging	 from	 the	 practice	 of	 gerrymandering	 frequent	 in	many	 established	
democracies,	to	the	more	radical	constitutional	transformations	enacted	by	Fidesz.		
To	sum-up,	many	existing	democratic	frameworks	allow	for	the	emergence	of	strong	
majorities,	 and	 for	 these	majorities	 to	 challenge	 the	 'procedural	minimum'	of	democracy	
through	constitutional	change	at	relatively	low	cost.	If	historically	in	these	situations	some	
actors,	 nevertheless,	 preferred	 institutionalized	 competition	 to	 radical	 constitutional	
reforms,	this	also	means	that	additional	factors	to	the	institutional	design	encouraged	these	
actors	 towards	 compliance.	 This	 implies	 that	 while	 well-designed	 institutions	 and	 high	
political	 competition	 may	 set	 favorable	 conditions	 to	 democratic	 consolidation	 -	 by	
increasing	 the	 benefits	 of	 playing	 according	 to	 the	 rules	 and	 heightening	 the	 risks	








One	hypothesis	would	be	to	set	 the	deeper	attachment	of	mainstream	elites	 to	 the	
democratic	process,	or	elite	loyalty,	as	such	a	condition.	Actors	that	are	solely	driven	by	the	
desire	to	acquire	more	power	are	 likely	 to	seize	any	available	opportunity	 to	do	so.	That	
institutions	are	cemented	and	perpetuated	by	the	ideas	and	beliefs	of	those	who	act	within	
them	is	an	insight	long	recognised	by	cultural	approaches	to	institutions	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	
2010;	 Gofas	 &	 Hay,	 2007;	 Schmidt,	 2008).	 Deeply-ingrained	 democratic	 norms	 are	 thus	
likely	 to	play	a	key	role	 in	the	 fact	 that	mainstream	elites	 in	high-stakes	systems,	such	as	
France	 or	 Britain,	 do	 not	 subvert	 democracy	 when	 their	 party	 obtains	 a	 strong	
parliamentary	majority.		
The	question	of	elite	loyalty	to	the	democratic	process	has	been	given	only	limited	
empirical	 attention.	 As	 previously	 underlined,	 many	 post-communist	 scholars	 implicitly	
assumed	 that	 mainstream	 parties	 in	 CEE	 countries	 were	 prepared	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
democratic	process,	based	on	their	respectful	behaviour	in	the	decade	following	the	initial	
phase	 of	 transition.	 Problematic	 actors	 are	 generally	 identified	 based	 on	 pre-conceived	
assumptions,	 rather	 than	 empirical	 examination.	 Thus,	 many	 CEE	 democracies	 were	
declared	 consolidated	 on	 the	 premises,	 first,	 that	 extremist	 parties	 achieved	 a	 rather	
limited	 electoral	 success	 and	 were	 marginalized	 by	 mainstream	 forces;	 second,	 that	
reformed	communist	parties	had	accepted	 the	democratic	 agenda.	On	 the	other	hand,	 as	
Hanley	repeatedly	insisted,	mainstream	governmental	parties	from	the	conservative	right	-	
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those	 that	 are	 today	most	 problematic	 in	 both	 Hungary	 and	 Poland	 -	 received	 the	 least	
attention	in	the	1990s	compared	to	those	other	two	groups	of	parties,	and	they	were	also	










	 While	 rational-institutionalist	 approaches	 over-estimated	 the	 protective	 role	 of	
well-designed	 institutions,	 they	also	under-estimated	 the	 function	party-citizen	dynamics	
may	 play	 in	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 democratic	 consolidation.	 Two	 main	 assumptions	




considered	 essential	 to	 the	 continued	 integrity	 of	 democratic	 institutions,	 and	 thus	 for	
democratic	 consolidation	 per	 se.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Hungary,	 however,	 the	 mobilization	 of	
citizens	by	a	mainstream	party	was	not	only	problematic	for	the	democratic	process,	but	a	





to	 positively	 affect	 the	 quality	 of	 newly-formed	 democracies	 over	 time.	 One	 category	 of	
literature	 focuses	 on	 correspondences	 between	 cleavages	 within	 society	 and	 political	
divisions	 within	 party	 systems.	 These	 studies	 identified	 correlations	 of	 various	 socio-
demographic	 characteristics	 with	 party	 preferences,	 correlations	 of	 socio-demographic	
characteristics	 with	 value	 patterns	 and	 policy	 preferences,	 and	 correlation	 of	 value	
patterns	and	policy	preferences	with	party	preferences	 (Evans	&	Whitefield,	1998,	2000;	
Miller	&	White,	1998;	Rose	&	Makkai,	1995;	Tóka,	1996,	1998;	Tworzecki,	2003;	van	der	
Brug,	Franklin,	&	Tóka,	2008).	A	 second	category	of	 studies	 focuses	on	 levels	of	political	
engagement	 in	 CEE.	 Despite	 the	 development	 of	 political	 cleavages,	 this	 engagement	






The	 CEE	party	 studies	 share	 this	positive	 outlook	on	 the	 development	 of	partisan	
ties	 within	 society.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 do	 not	 describe	 the	 mobilization	 of	 citizens	 by	
parties	as	a	determinant	 factor	 in	 the	 continued	 integrity	of	democratic	 institutions.	The	
weakness	 of	 partisan	 ties	 in	 CEE	 is	 generally	 considered	 a	 regrettable,	 yet	 transitory	
phenomenon;	a	problem	that	can	be	expected	to	regress	over	time,	rather	than	a	reservoir	
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on	which	 populist	mobilization	may	 subsequently	 thrive.	 An	 implicit	 assumption	 of	 this	
literature	 is	 that	 party	 system	 institutionalization	will	 further	 citizens’	 ability	 to	 identify	
with	parties.	Markowski	 lists	 the	 following	positive	 consequences	of	 increasingly	 regular	
patterns	 of	 competition:	 ‘"clarity	 of	 responsibility",	 "decisiveness	 of	 elections",	 "political	
representation",	 (real)	 "opportunity	 for	 political	 choice"	 (system	 alternativeness)	 and	
other	 features	of	 contemporary	democracies	 (i.e.	 effectiveness,	 efficacy,	political	 support,	
etc)’	(Markowski,	2001a,	p.	48).		
	 The	importance	of	party-citizen	ties	in	CEE	was	also	minimized	by	invoking	the	high	
levels	 of	 citizen	 disengagement	 in	 older	 democracies	 (on	 the	 situation	 of	 established	




strong	 citizen	mobilization	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 “ignores	 the	 very	 substantial	 changes	 that	
took	 place	 in	 the	 nature	 and	 role	 of	 parties	 in	 well-established	 Western	 democracies"	
(Schmitter,	 1992,	 pp.	 426-427).	 Similarly,	 Kitschelt	 et	 al.	 put	 that	 “the	 absence	 of	 mass	
party	 membership	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 (…)	 may	 simply	 be	 a	 result	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 these	









party	could	not	have	carried	out	 its	constitutional	reforms	without	 the	strong	majority	 it	
obtained	in	April	2010.	The	Fidesz-KDNP	joint	list	then	rallied	52.36%	of	expressed	votes,	a	
gain	of	over	10	points	as	compared	to	the	previous	2006	parliamentary	elections.	Its	main	
opponent,	 the	 MSzP,	 achieved	 a	 mere	 19.3%	 of	 the	 votes	 in	 2010,	 losing	 24	 points	 as	
compared	 to	 four	years	before.	As	will	be	discussed	 in	 the	 last	section	of	 this	paper,	 this	
was	 also	made	 possible	 because	 of	 Fidesz's	 strategies	 of	mobilization:	 a	 strong	 populist	
message,	and	the	development	of	one	of	the	most	socially	embedded	party	organizations	in	
post-communist	Europe	(Enyedi,	forthcoming;	Enyedi	&	Linek,	2008).	These	developments	










party	 system	 of	 a	 consolidated	 democracy,	 but	 only	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 they	 fail	 to	

















be	 considered	 as	 protected	 from	 the	 threat	 of	 erosion.	 These	 may	 be	 spelt	 out	 in	 the	
following	 proposition:	 a	 democracy	 is	 consolidated	 when	 no	 mainstream	 political	 party	
displays	 a	 lack	 of	 commitment	 to	 the	 democratic	 process	 and	 has	 a	 strong	 capacity	 for	
citizen	mobilization.	The	second	half	of	this	paper	builds	on	the	above-analysis	to	suggest	
some	avenues	of	theoretical	and	empirical	research.	More	specifically,	it	defends	the	need	
to	 theorize	 and	 study	 democratic	 consolidation	 as	 a	 process	 of	 cultural	 change	 in	which	
party-citizen	 interactions	 play	 a	 central	 role.	 	 The	 following	 section	 describes	 existing	
culturalist	 approaches	 to	 democratization,	 and	 the	 reasons	 why	 these	 have	 been	 less	
influential	 than	 their	 rational-institutionalist	 counterparts.	 It	 then	 underlines	 ways	 in	
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which	party	strategies	of	citizen	mobilization	can	be	integrated	within	a	cultural	approach	





A	 number	 of	 authors	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 mass	 and	 elite	 attitudinal	
transformations	 for	 the	 long-term	 survival	of	democratic	 regimes.	 In	 this	 understanding,	
that	can	be	referred	to	as	‘culturalist’,	democracy	is	consolidated	when	no	significant	actor	
or	part	of	 the	population	 considers	 re-negotiating	 the	democratic	 rules	of	 the	game.	The	
stabilization	 of	 democracy	 thus	 implies	 that	 “democracy	 becomes	 so	 broadly	 and	
profoundly	 legitimate	 among	 citizens	 that	 it	 is	 very	 unlikely	 to	 break	 down”	 (Diamond,	
1994,	p.	15;	Miller,	White,	&	Heywood,	1997;	see	also	Plasser,	Ulram,	&	Waldrauch,	1998;	
Plattner	 &	 Diamond,	 1996).	 In	 Easton’s	 terminology,	 the	 democratic	 regime	 needs	 to	
generate	diffuse	support,	an	affective	orientation	referring	“to	evaluations	of	what	an	object	
is	or	represents	–	to	the	general	meaning	it	has	for	a	person”	(Easton,	1975,	p.	444).	This	
also	 means	 that	 elite	 and	mass	 support	 for	 democratic	 institutions	 does	 not	 stem	 from	
pragmatic	 compliance	 or	 vested	 interests,	 but	 from	 deeply	 entrenched	 values	 –	 thus	
scandals	or	economic	difficulties	do	not	fundamentally	affect	citizens’	regime	preferences,	
and	electoral	defeat	or	victory	do	not	affect	elites’	regime	preferences	(Dryzek	&	Holmes,	
2002,	p.	9;	Linz	&	Stepan,	1996,	p.	16).	 In	 these	approaches,	cultural	changes	result	 from	
processes	 of	 modernization,	 with	 certain	 social	 and	 economic	 developments	 viewed	 as	
	 29	




economic	 inequality,	 and	 accompanying	 the	 rise	 of	 education	 levels	 (Fish,	 1998;	 Lipset,	
1994,	pp.	2-3;	Przeworski,	Alvarez,	Cheibub,	&	Limongi,	1996).		
	 Drawing	on	this	academic	tradition,	a	branch	of	post-communist	studies	emphasise	
the	 path-dependency	 of	 various	 CEE	 trajectories,	 tracing	 the	 effect	 of	 country-specific	
legacies	on	the	social,	political	and	economic	developments	of	the	1990s.	A	share	of	these	
argue	that	the	state	and	civil	society	structures	of	the	pre-1989	era	affected	post-socialist	
paths	 of	 extrication	 from	 communist	 rule,	 including	 elite	 negotiations	 and	 the	 resulting	
institutional	arrangements	of	the	early	1990s	(Bunce,	2003;	Kitschelt	et	al.,	1999;	Stark	&	
Bruszt,	1998).	 Subsequent	developments	 in	 these	democracies	were	also	associated	with	
the	legacies	of	communist	rule.	For	example,	scholars	examined	the	influence	of	communist	
regime	 types	 on	 the	 shape	 and	 representativeness	 of	 emerging	 patterns	 of	 party	
competition	in	Poland,	Hungary	and	the	Czech	Republic	(Kitschelt	et	al.,	op.	cit).	Wittenberg	
analysed	the	instrumental	role	of	church	institutions	in	socialist	Hungary	for	the	survival	of	
pre-communist	 conservative	 political	 identities	 in	 post-communist	 times	 (Wittenberg,	
2006).	 Others	 examined	 how	 networks	 of	 economic	 ties	 under	 socialism	 conditioned	
democratic	governance	and	economic	policy-making	after	1989	(Stark	&	Bruszt,	1998).		
These	approaches	to	democratic	consolidation	were	criticised	for	not	specifying	the	
mechanisms	 by	 which	 political	 culture	 is	 transformed,	 and	 risks	 of	 democratic	 erosion	
subsequently	 reduced	 (Schedler,	 1998,	 p.	 104).	 Especially	 compared	 to	 the	 rational-
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institutionalist	model	,	culturalist	approaches	lack	analytical	clarity.	Certainly,	many	of	the	
processes	discussed	by	 culturalist	 approaches	-	 economic	growth,	 the	 institutionalization	
of	party	systems,	the	development	of	mass	education,	the	growth	of	civil	society,	etc.	-	are	
likely	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 mass	 and	 elite	 attitudes.	 However,	 as	
summarized	by	Hanson,	“modernization	theory	contains	no	compelling	causal	mechanism	
that	might	satisfactorily	explain	the	cultural	correlations	it	emphasizes”	(Hanson,	2001,	p.	
132).	 In	 other	 words,	 while	 correlations	 may	 be	 established	 between	 given	 economic,	
social	or	 political	 trends	 and	 the	 length	 of	 survival	 of	 democratic	 regimes,	 the	 processes	
that	 effectively	 link	 these	 macro-phenomena	 to	 the	 diffusion	 of	 mass	 support	 for	
democratic	 institutions	 remain	 both	 under-theorized	 and	 empirically	 under-investigated	
(Dryzek	&	Holmes,	 2002,	 p.	 16;	 Kubik,	 2003,	 pp.	 318-322).	 As	 a	 result,	 how	 culture	 can	
itself	evolve	or	integrate	different	elements,	for	instance,	by	becoming	more	democratic,	is	
also	difficult	to	apprehend.	These	elements	led	to	deterministic	arguments,	where	culture	
“descends	 from	 heaven	 to	 influence	 the	 course	 of	 history”	 (Haughton,	 2005,	 p.	 6),	 and	






integrate	 the	 role	 of	 agency	 in	 processes	 of	 democratic	 change.	 	 This	 section	 identifies	
parties	 in	 their	 functions	 of	 citizen	 mobilization	 as	 key	 agents	 that	 contribute	 to	 such	
transformations.	 These	 organizations	 mediate	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 state	 in	 a	
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democratic	 polity;	 they	 channel	 popular	 demands	 and	 account	 for	 their	 execution.	 The	
strategies	 they	 use	 to	 mobilize	 citizens	 will	 thus	 shape	 citizens'	 perceptions	 of	 the	






represent	 citizens.	 Because	 constituents	 never	 offer	 themselves	 as	 a	 homogenous,	 pre-
defined	 entity	 with	 a	 clear	 and	 encompassing	 set	 of	 interests,	 parties	 need	 to	 interpret	
what	these	interests	are	and	make	choices	as	to	how	they	should	be	represented	(Saward,	
2010;	 Young,	 2000,	 p.	 126).	 As	 emphasised	 by	 Saward,	 representation	 as	 an	 activity	
"centrally	 involves	 offering	 constructions	 or	 images	 of	 constituents	 to	 constituents	 and	
audiences”,	and	is	thus	primarily	about	“the	active	making	of	symbols	or	images	of	what	is	
to	be	represented”	(Saward	2010,	pp.	14-15).	
This	 is	 consequential	 for	 citizens	 themselves,	 and	 their	 self-identification.	 Citizen	
identities	 are	 conceived	 here	 not	 as	 fixed	 and	 pre-existing	 to	 representation,	 but	 as	
malleable	 and	 influenced	 by	 its	 processes.	 Crucially,	 “(p)arties	 do	 more	 than	 organize	
beliefs,	 interests,	 attitudes	 for	 political	 purposes.	 They	 discover	 and	 define	 politically	
relevant	 differences	 (...)"	 (Muirhead	 &	 Rosenblum,	 2006,	 p.	 103).	 There	 is	 then	 a	 strong	









It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 this	 creative	 dimension	 of	 partisan	 mobilization	 in	
relatively	 young	 democracies.	 In	 early	 20th	 century	 Western	 Europe,	 party	 systems	
structured	how	generations	of	citizens	engaged	with	and	understood	politics,	and	this	by	
forging	 strong	 normative	 projects	 around	 existing	 social	 cleavages	 (Campbell,	 Converse,	
Miller,	&	 Stokes,	 1960;	 Rokkan	&	 Lipset,	 1967).	 Similarly,	 the	 post-communist	 context	 is	
one	 in	 which	 new	 cleavages	 were	 defined	 and	 new	 political	 identities	 emerged.	 In	 this	
process,	the	attempts	of	parties	to	represent	citizens	and	mobilize	them	around	competing	
platforms	will	have	had	a	strong	influence	on	the	stabilization	of	political	identities.	In	the	
wake	 of	 regime	 changes,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 the	 definition	 of	 constituencies	 and	
partisan	affiliations	that	is	at	stake:	there	also	exists	a	broader	struggle	over	re-defining	the	
identity	 of	 the	 community	 as	 a	whole.	 As	 emphasised	 by	 Jowitt,	 the	 end	 of	 communism	
created	a	“genesis	environment,”	characterized	by	"the	dissolution	of	existing	boundaries	
and	 related	 identities	 and	 the	 corresponding	 potential	 to	 generate	 novel	 ways	 of	 life”	
(Jowitt,	 1992,	 p.	 266).17	With	 the	 end	 of	 decades	 of	 socialist	 rhetoric	 and	 the	 economic	
turmoil	 of	 the	 post-1989	 years,	 leaders	 were	 given	 a	 golden	 opportunity	 to	 satisfy	 the	
yearning	of	these	transitioning	polities	for	narratives	and	myths	(Tismaneanu,	1998).		
                                                             
17	Or,	as	formulated	by	Offe,	"post-communist	societies	have	had	to	make	a	decision	as	to	"who	'we'	are;	that	is,	a	decision	
on	 identity,	 citizenship,	and	 the	 territorial	as	well	 as	 social	and	 cultural	boundaries	of	 the	nation-state"	 (Offe,	2004,	p.	
505). 
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If	 parties	 socialize	 citizens,	 then	 democratic	 consolidation	 as	 a	 radical	 form	 of	
cultural	change	 is	also	dependent	on	the	commitment	of	mainstream	elites	 to	democratic	
norms,	 and	 on	 the	 strategies	 parties	 deploy	 to	 mobilize	 citizens	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	
commitments.	As	 Jowitt	continues	in	his	diagnosis	of	 the	post-1989	condition,	 “for	a	new	
way	of	 life	 to	assert	 itself,	 a	 social	minority	must	 completely	 identify	with	and	accept	an	
imperative	 task	 (...)	 for	 a	 critical	 period	 of	 time	 during	 which	 new	 elites,	 practices,	
organizations	 institutionally	 coagulate”	 (Jowitt,	 1992,	 pp.	 267-268).	 Jackson	 provides	 an	
example	of	such	processes	of	elite	legitimation	in	his	analysis	of	the	civilizational	discourse	
of	American	and	German	elites	 in	post-war	Germany	 (Jackson,	2006).	Demonstrating	 the	
importance	of	elite	rhetoric	 in	 times	of	radical	political	change,	he	 insists	 that	"enormous	
flows	 of	 resources	 and	 reconfigurations	 of	 political	 practice	 require	 justification,	 and	
absent	 (elites')	 rhetorical	 deployments	 (...)	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 resulting	 policies	 and	
institutions	 would	 have	 taken	 the	 form	 that	 they	 ultimately	 did"	 (Jackson,	 2006,	 p.	 ix).	
Establishing	 the	 superiority	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	 'novel	 way	 of	 life'	 in	 CEE	 will	 similarly	
require	that	elites	legitimate	the	new	regime	through	the	public	deployment	of	rhetoric.		
*	*	*	
Building	 on	 cultural	 theories	 of	 democratization	 and	 new	 theories	 of	 political	










to	 political	 agents	 for	 re-interpretation	 and	 transformation.	 This	 is	 the	 semiotic	
understanding	 of	 culture	 prevalent	 in	 the	 field	 of	 political	 ethnography	 and,	 more	
generally,	 in	 studies	 adopting	 an	 interpretive	 standpoint.	 Gamson,	 for	 instance,	 defines	
culture	as	 “the	 systems	of	 signs	available	 for	 talking,	writing	and	 thinking	about	political	
objects:	the	myths	and	metaphors,	the	language	and	idea	elements,	the	frames,	ideologies,	
values	and	condensing	symbols”	(Gamson,	1988,	p.	220).18	Conceived	in	this	way,	political	
culture	 may	 be	 studied	 by	 observing	 the	 use	 that	 agents	 make	 of	 this	 system	 of	 signs.	
Interpretive	 methodologies	 thus	 take	 as	 their	 object	 the	 meaning-making	 activities	 of	
individuals,	 divided	 between	methods	 focusing	 on	 language	 and	 discourse	 -	 for	 instance	
discourse	analysis,	dialogical	analysis,	or	mentalism	-	and	methods	that	focus	on	practice,	
mainly	 participant	 forms	 of	 observations	 (Bevir	 &	 Rhodes,	 2010;	 Schatz,	 2009;	 White,	




the	 present	 case,	 such	methods	 account	more	 closely	 for	 the	meaning	 elites	 and	 citizens	
                                                             
18	Such	a	conception	may	be	opposed	to	the	classic	definition	of	political	culture,	defended	for	instance	 in	Almond	and	
Verba's	 study	 of	 Civic	 Culture	 (Almond	 &	 Verba,	 1963).	 Here	 culture	 is	 theorized	 as	 a	 "syndrome	 of	 attitudes,	 (...)	 a	







On	 this	 basis,	 three	 interrelated	 topics	would	warrant	 further	 empirical	 research:	
the	degree	of	commitment	of	mainstream	party	elites	to	democratic	norms;	their	discursive	
and	 organizational	 strategies	 to	 mobilize	 citizens;	 and	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 parties	
contribute	to	citizen	socialization	in	deploying	these	strategies.		
	 Elite	commitments	to	the	democratic	process	
As	 stressed	 above,	 a	 deeper	 commitment	 of	mainstream	 elites	 to	 the	 democratic	
process	ensures	that	these	exercise	restraint	when	faced	with	an	opportunity	to	undermine	




domestic	 and	 international	 legitimacy	 (Zakaria,	 1997).	 In	 CEE,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
widespread	elite	 consensus	on	 the	objective	of	EU	accession	 in	 the	1990s	precluded	any	
explicit	 advocacy	of	 alternatives	 to	democracy	 (Batory,	2008;	Vachudova,	2008).	 Surveys	
that	 rely	 on	 respondents’	 approval	 or	 disapproval	 of	 very	 general	 categories	 such	 as	
‘democracy'	 and	 'authoritarianism,’	 would	 be,	 therefore,	 typically	 inappropriate	 for	
studying	 commitments	 to	 democratic	 norms.	 Not	 only	 would	 elites	 be	 likely	 to	 answer	
these	 surveys	 in	 a	way	 they	 deem	 socially	 desirable,	 but	 these	 answers	would	 say	 little	
about	 what	 individuals	 understand	 by	 these	 categories	 (Dryzek	 &	 Holmes,	 2002).	 As	
                                                             
19 Recently,	 the	 Hungarian	 Prime	 Minister	 has,	 nevertheless,	 made	 statements	 that	 more	 explicitly	 opposed	 liberal	
democracy	 as	 a	 regime,	 defending	 the	 need	 for	 his	 party	 "to	 abandon	 liberal	methods	 and	 principles	 of	 organizing	 a	
society"	and	to	build	an	"illiberal	state"	in	Hungary	(Orbán,	2014).	 
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developed	 below,	 elite	 public	 discourse	 may	 provide	 implicit	 expressions	 of	 loyalty	 or	
disloyalty	 to	 democratic	 norms	 (Linz,	 1978,	 pp.	 28-38),	 but	 given	 the	 weight	 of	 EU	
constraints	these	will	only	offer	limited	indications.	The	same	logic	applies	to	one-on-one	
elite	 interviews,	 in	 which	 respondents	 will	 not	 openly	 acknowledge	 whether	 they	 are	
committed	to	the	democratic	process	(Steiner,	Bächtiger,	Spörndli,	&	Steenbergen,	2004,	p.	
54;	White,	2011,	p.	45).	
If	 elite	 discourse	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 vary	 depending	 on	 the	 context	 and	 audience	
that	is	being	addressed,	studying	such	variations	would	provide	a	first	indication	of	these	
norms.	 One	 would	 then	 need	 to	 compare	 instances	 of	 elite	 discourse	 that	 take	 place	 in	
environments	that	are	more	or	less	constrained	by	international	norms,	or	in	other	words,	
observe	whether	elites	are	more	explicit	about	undemocratic	commitments	where	costs	of	
doing	 so	 are	 lower.	 Comparing	 discourse	 destined	 for	 an	 international	 public	 to	 one	
destined	to	a	domestic	public	may	provide	such	 indications,	especially	when	the	national	
language	is	not	widely	spoken	abroad.	Similarly,	one	could	compare	the	public	declarations	
of	 elites	 to	 the	ones	 they	use	 in	more	private	settings,	or	among	 their	peers.	 	Participant	
observation,	 a	 method	 defined	 as	 "the	 process	 of	 learning	 through	 exposure	 to	 or	
involvement	 in	 the	 day-to-day	 or	 routine	 activities	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 researcher	
setting",	may	be	one	way	of	getting	closer	to	such	private	forms	of	discourse	(Schensul	&	
LeCompte,	1999).	Immersion	in	the	internal	life	of	a	given	party,	for	instance	spending	an	
extended	 period	 of	 time	within	 a	 party	headquarter	 or	 a	ministry,	would	 typically	 allow	
access	to	group	discussions	among	elites	where	more	explicit	expressions	of	democratic	or	
undemocratic	commitments	would	be	evident	(see	Belzile	&	0berg,	2012,	p.	467;	Bevir	&	









As	 previously	 emphasised,	 to	 undermine	 democracy's	 'procedural	 minimum'	
mainstream	parties	with	a	disloyal	leadership	need	to	win	a	large	parliamentary	majority,	
and	thus	to	rally	a	substantial	part	of	the	electorate.	Empirical	work	is	thus	warranted	on	
how	 such	 parties	 can	 successfully	 mobilize	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 a	 democratic	
constitutional	 framework,	 and	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	 constrained	 international	 environment.	
Two	dimensions	of	 these	strategies	would	deserve	specific	 attention.	First,	 the	 ideational	
component,	or	 in	other	words,	 the	platforms	on	which	mainstream	parties	mobilize;	 and	
second,	 the	 organizational	 component,	 that	 is	 the	 networks,	 events,	 and	 resources	 that	
parties	rely	on	to	increase	their	societal	reach.		
As	mainstream	parties	with	a	disloyal	leadership	cannot	be	explicit	about	their	lack	
of	 democratic	 commitment,	 alternative	 discursive	 strategies	 can	 be	 expected	 that	 will	
render	 their	 claim	 to	 power	 more	 acceptable	 in	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 arena.	
Populism	 is	 a	 likely	 candidate,	 precisely	 because	 it	 carries	 an	 ambivalent	 democratic	
message.	The	populist	speaker	claims	to	act	in	the	name	of	the	'People',	and	yet	denies	the	
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legitimacy	 of	 alternative	 claims	 to	 citizen	 representation.20	 One	 of	 the	 distinguishing	
features	of	CEE	populism	is	that	it	frequently	affects	the	political	mainstream,	in	contrast	to	
Western	European	party	systems	where	such	rhetoric	tends	to	be	contained	at	the	fringes	
of	party	 systems	 (Mudde,	2002).	Concerning	Fidesz,	 existing	 studies	show	 that	 the	party	
started	 deploying	 such	 rhetoric	 prior	 to	 the	 1998	 election	 campaign,	 and	 radicalized	
continuously	until	2010.	Fidesz's	discourse	repeatedly	depicts	the	nation	as	a	unitary	actor	
that	can	only	legitimately	be	represented	by	the	Fidesz,	and	their	opposition	as	a	corrupt	
and	 elitist	 clique	 that	 tramples	 on	 the	 nation's	 interests	 (Bozóki,	 2008;	 Bozóki	 &	 Kriza,	
2008,	p.	217;	Centre	 for	 fair	political	analysis,	2013;	Enyedi,	 forthcoming;	Palonen,	2006;	
2009,	 pp.	 322-324).21	 More	 systematic	 comparative	 work	 across	 the	 region	 would	 be	
required	 to	 map	 the	 type	 of	 discursive	 strategies	 mainstream	 parties	 deploy,	 and	 the	
degree	 to	which	 they	 can	 be	 labelled	 as	 populist	 (for	 an	 operationalization,	 see	Deegan-
Krause	 &	 Haughton,	 2009).	 Attention	 should	 also	 be	 given	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 these	
discursive	strategies	over	time,	and	the	circumstances	under	which	they	prove	successful	
                                                             
20	Because	populism	defends	popular	sovereignty	as	a	high	but	neglected	ideal,	some	scholars	have	described	this	type	of	
rhetoric	 as	 a	 radical	 form	 of	 democratic	 discourse,	 one	 that	 could	 provide	 a	 useful	 corrective	 to	 the	 increasingly	








forthcoming).	 More	 recently,	 speaking	 about	 the	 'liberal-left'	 (balliberális)	 elites	 at	 the	 commemoration	 of	 the	 1956	





for	 mobilizing	 citizens.	 In	 Hungary	 for	 instance,	 the	 deep	 political	 and	 economic	 crisis	
under	MSzP's	2006-2010	mandate	was	pivotal	in	giving	traction	to	Fidesz's	appeals.22		
	 Citizen	 mobilization	 also	 has	 an	 organizational	 dimension.	 Beyond	 the	 platforms	
parties	 defend,	 they	 deploy	 means	 to	 communicate	 their	 message	 and	 achieve	 public	
visibility.	In	established	democracies,	parties	progressively	ceased	to	rely	on	membership	
to	gather	funds	and	diffuse	their	ideas	from	the	1960s	onwards,	and	now	depend	far	more	
heavily	 on	 state	 resources	 and	 the	 mass	 media	 for	 these	 purposes	 (Katz	 &	 Mair,	 1995,	
2009).	Given	the	weak	ties	CEE	parties	had	with	civil	society	in	the	early	1990s,	they	also	
established	 statuses	 that	 minimized	 their	 dependence	 on	 private	 donations	 and	
membership	 fees,	 gave	 a	 strong	 role	 to	 state	 funding,	 and	 tightly	 regulated	 campaign	
advertisement	(Kopecký,	2006).	Despite	 the	steep	decline	 in	 the	membership	numbers	of	
Western	European	parties,	 these	numbers	still	 remain	 far	higher	than	 in	post-communist	




	 More	 empirical	 research	 is	 thus	 warranted	 to	 explain	 variations	 in	 the	
organizational	models	of	parties	across	the	region,	and	explore	the	reasons	why	some	were	
more	 successful	 than	 others	 at	 developing	 a	 strong	 social	 basis.	 The	 Hungarian	 party	
system	is	a	case	in	point.	While	the	ageing	membership	of	MSzP	declined	steadily	since	the	
                                                             
22	The	international	economic	crisis	hit	the	country	particularly	hard	in	2008,	and	was	coupled	with	a	local,	political	crisis.	








in	 2011	 (Saltman,	 2014,	pp.	 105-106).	 In	 parallel,	 the	 number	 of	 local	 party	 branches	 of	
Fidesz	also	increased	between	2001	and	2005	from	around	400	to	1050	(Enyedi	&	Linek,	
2008,	 pp.	 462-463).23	 The	 electoral	 advantages	 that	 such	 a	 member-based	 organization	
provides	 to	parties	have	been	under-researched	 in	 the	 case	of	CEE.	Fidesz	achieved	high	
visibility	 in	 the	 public	 space	 of	 major	 cities	 thanks	 to	 its	 dense	 network	 of	 supporters,	
organizing	regular	town-hall	meetings,	public	discussions,	and	demonstrations.	Spectacular	
actions	 included	 the	 coordination	 of	 a	 number	 of	mass	 rallies	 that	 united	 over	 100	 000	
participants	in	2006,	and	the	organization	of	four	large-scale	petitions	that	collected	close	
to	 a	million	 signatures	 (Enyedi	&	 Linek,	 2008,	 p.	 464).	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 established	 how	
these	strategies	served	its	2010	landslide	electoral	victory.	
	 	 The	socializing	role	of	parties	 	 	
	 If	 the	 long-term	 consolidation	 of	 democracy	 is	 dependent	 on	 parties	 promoting	
democratic	norms	among	the	broader	citizenry,	disloyal	parties	will	also	seek	to	diffuse	to	
the	broader	public	their	lack	of	democratic	commitment.	 	This	process	serves	parties	in	a	
number	of	ways.	 It	may	expand	 the	party's	 capacity	 for	mobilizing	 citizens,	 first	 through	
the	radicalization	of	its	existing	basis	of	support,	and	second	through	expanding	its	reach	to	




                                                             
23	This	is	all	the	more	remarkable	given	that,	as	emphasised	by	Enyedi	and	Linek,	this	growth	took	place	mostly	during	
periods	 where	 Fidesz	 was	 in	 opposition,	 suggesting	 genuine	 popular	 mobilization	 rather	 than	 the	 development	 of	
clientelistic	networks	(Enyedi	&	Linek,	2008,	pp.	462-463)	
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	 Empirical	 research	should	examine	how	disloyal	 leaderships	draw	on	 the	existing	
preferences	 of	 citizens,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 also	 socialize	 citizens	 into	 non-
democratic	 norms.	 Pre-existing	 political	 identities	 -	 values,	 interests	 and	 group	
membership	-	necessarily	limit	the	creative	dimension	of	partisan	representation	(Enyedi,	
2005).	More	broadly,	 the	ability	of	parties	 to	mobilize	around	a	project	 is	dependent	not	
only	on	the	leader's	agency,	but	also	on	what	Gamson	terms	the	‘cultural	resonance’	of	the	
party’s	broader	message	(Gamson,	1992,	p.	135).	In	this	sense	parties	are	constrained	by	a	
pre-existing	context,	a	context	 that	may	not	be	 favourable	to	 the	emergence	of	pluralistic	
norms	 of	 political	 competition.	 This	 opens	 up	 a	 wealth	 of	 other	 relevant	 questions,	 for	
instance	whether	 certain	 types	of	mobilization	 strategies	are	more	 'creative'	 than	others	
over	 time;	 whether	 certain	 groups	 in	 a	 given	 population	 are	 more	 influenced	 by	 these	
strategies	 than	 others;	 or	whether	 socializing	 effects	 are	 stronger	 in	 new	 rather	 than	 in	
established	democracies.		
	 A	number	of	disciplines	relying	on	a	variety	of	different	methods	explore	these	types	
of	 questions,	 and	 may	 provide	 inspiration	 for	 future	 research.	 For	 instance,	 the	 recent	
'contextualist'	 turn	 in	 public	 opinion	 and	 political	 psychology	 studies	 is	 providing	






in	 newly-found	democracies.	 Relying	 on	 in-depth	 interviews	 and	 participant	 observation	
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methods	to	study	youth	activism	in	contemporary	Hungary,	Saltman	shows	that	parties	are	
core	 institutions	 of	 political	 socialization	 among	 younger	 Hungarian	 cohorts	 (Saltman,	
2014).	 But	 quantitative	 methods	 may	 also	 be	 appropriate	 for	 such	 an	 endeavour.	 For	
instance,	using	surveys	and	voting	data,	Enyedi	defended	the	relevance	of	an	approach	to	
cleavage	formation	in	CEE	that	starts	with	the	"strategic	calculations	of	the	political	actors	
and	 not	 with	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 preferences	 in	 the	 society"	 (Enyedi,	 2005,	 p.	 699).	
According	to	him,	the	ideological	trajectory	of	Fidesz	towards	a	form	of	national-populism	
since	 the	 mid-1990s	 contributed	 to	 attitudinal	 changes	 within	 Hungarian	 society,	





consolidation	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 'procedural	 minimum'	 of	 Hungarian	
democracy	since	2010.	The	conditions	set	out	by	these	models	-	well-designed	institutions	






among	 the	 broader	 citizenry.	 Importantly,	 parties	 do	 not	 simply	 reflect	 pre-existing	
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political	 preferences	 but	 contribute	 to	 shape	 these,	 thus	 taking	 on	 a	 role	 as	 agents	 of	
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